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A. What Are Underdeveloped Areas?
The term "underdeveloped" areas encompasses a great variety of socioeconomic-
demographic situations. The countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, which
are often referred to in the literature as the underdeveloped parts of the world, are
all very different from each other in many respects, both economic and noneconomic.
The noneconomic differences, comprising as they do language and observable social
customs, are immediately recognizable to even the most casual of observers.
The economic differences may be less noticeable, however, especially to the tourist
who sees but the capital cities. Nevertheless, some idea of the great variation that
exists can be obtained by noting that annual per capita national income in Puerto Rico
is over $4oo. This is about double that of Mexico; which, in turn, may be about
double that of Guatemala or Honduras; which, in turn, may be about double that
of Bolivia. Thus, within Latin America-an underdeveloped area-the most
prosperous (or least underdeveloped) country may be perhaps ten times as well off
as the poorest. When compared with the United States, which has an annual per
capita national income of over $2,ooo, however, even the most prosperous of the
Latin American countries appears underdeveloped.
Still, these countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America all have in common the
fact that their economic development-as measured in either annual per capita
national income or annual per capita use of inanimate energy-is very much below
that of North America and northwestern Europe. Hence, we are justified in ex-
amining them as a group of countries that are economically quite different from
ourselves. We ask the reader, however, to keep in mind the fact that large differ-
ences among countries do exist and that any generalizations that we shall make do
not necessarily apply uniformly to all underdeveloped countries.
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Similar observations can also be made about the variation within the countries
of North America, Europe, Oceania, and the Soviet Union, which we group to-
gether as the "developed" areas. Indeed, some students have included southern and
eastern Europe with the underdeveloped areas. For the sake of simplicity and on
the grounds that substantially the same results will emerge, however, we prefer to
allocate entire continents to one or the other group of countries.
But with respect to demographic characteristics, we do wish to emphasize here, in
anticipation of our subsequent discussion, that very many of these underdeveloped
countries do seem to be rather similar. Certainly, there is less variation with respect
to rates of population growth and population characteristics than there is with respect
to income or energy consumed. Hence, despite the fact these countries may differ
considerably in economic position, enough of them are sufficiently similar demo-
graphically to warrant our discussing population trends in underdeveloped countries.
Before proceeding to our analysis, we must bring to the reader's attention the
fact of the paucity of reliable data covering all of the underdeveloped countries. We
have pieces of information about many countries, but complete information about
none. Hence, we are often forced to speak in broad and general terms in order
to spread a limited amount of factual information over a large number of countries.
B. The Interrelated Matrix of Factors1
Population changes are but one element in an interrelated matrix of events.
Demographic trends, like economic development, are an integral part of an entire
process of socioeconomic-demographic changes. If one factor changes, others must
also. These changes do not necessarily occur simultaneously; furthermore, we do not
know enough to be able to predict the exact relationship between any two variables,
so that we cannot always estimate the amount or nature of change that will be pro-
duced in variable b if we know that variable a changes in a certain manner.
Why should we be concerned with knowing the precise relationships among
the variables? The answer is simply this: if we really understood them, then we
could predict future demographic trends in the underdeveloped countries on the
basis of current socioeconomic information. Although our knowledge is limited,
we do have considerable factual information about such elements as current rate of
economic growth, rate of capital formation, extent of literacy and school attendance,
degree of urbanization, etc. We even have some information regarding the political
and social aims and aspirations of peoples, their attitudes toward work versus leisure,.
their religious attitudes, etc. If we were now able to wrap all of these into a neat
prediction equation-one that would take into consideration both the manner in
which these factors will influence future demographic changes and the manner in-
which such demographic changes will influence these other variables-then we.
I For further discussion of this point, see, e.g., A. J. JAFFE & C. D. STEWART, MANPOWER RESOURCES.
AND UTILIZATION ch. 21 (195I).
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could predict exactly what population changes will occur in the various under-
developed parts of the world.
Clearly, we cannot present the reader with a complete matrix of factors. All we
can do is state emphatically that changes in demographic characteristics-particularly
a lowering of fertility and rates of population growth-will not occur in the absence
of other fundamental changes in the social and economic structures. Hence, in the
following pages, we shall examine a few factors that we believe influence birth
rates and population growth and then describe how population growth, in turn, in-
fluences economic progress-the rise from underdeveloped, to semideveloped, to
fully-developed economies. This latter does not imply that all parts of the world
will necessarily become fully-developed economies. Maybe some day all parts
of the world will be on about the same economic level; on the other hand, it is
possible that economic growth will continue throughout the world so as to maintain
a large advantage for the presently developed countries. To the extent, then, that
"underdeveloped" is a relative concept, many parts of the world will continue to be
underdeveloped for the next few generations or longer, no matter how much growth
they may achieve, simply because the United States, Canada, Europe, Oceania, and
the Soviet Union will continue to grow also.
C. The Time Factor
When discussing population trends, obviously we are utilizing time as one of the
dimensions under consideration. Furthermore, we are concerned largely with study-
ing the past and present in order to estimate the future. Now, our concern is with
the short-run future, rather than the long-run. We emphasize this distinction since
so much of the present-day discussion is made fruitless by the adversaries talking
about different "futures"--as, for example, the futile discussion in which Paul
Hoffman talked of the problems he faced during the 196o's and Colin Clark talked
aimlessly about some indefinite period two or more centuries into the future On
the grounds that we can discuss most intelligently only the next two or three decades,
we are limiting our analysis to such a short-run period. To discuss a longer period,
one must be either a Nostradamus or an ancient Biblical prophet, or one must talk





During the first two decades of the twentieth century, the population of developed
countries-i.e., North America, Europe including the Soviet Union, and Oceania-
grew at an annual rate of one per cent or slightly less; that of the remaining
2 CBS REPORTs, TkE POia-mTsoN EXPLOSION (as broadcast over the CBS Television Network, Jan. 14,
ig6o).
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countries, the underdeveloped parts of the world, grew at half this rate, or slightly
less-as is shown in table one. The great variation among countries during this
period can be seen from the fact that the population of Japan grew at a rate of about
1.3 per cent annually, whereas that of the rest of Asia grew at a rate of about o.2
per cent. The population of Latin America, on the other hand, grew at a rate of
some 2.1 per cent annually during the period 9oo to i92o; and that of North
America, part of the economically developed world, grew at exactly the same rate.
Clearly, there was very wide variation among the several parts of the world. We
can only say that on the whole, population growth in the developed parts of the
world was much more rapid than in the underdeveloped parts.
TABLE I
AVERAGE ANNUAL RATES OF POPULATION GROWTH BY CONTINENTS AND REGIONS. 190o-57
(PERCENTAGE)
Regions 1900-20 1920-40 1940-50 1950-57
Underdeveloped areas ................... 0.4 1.3 1.5 1.9
Africa ........................... 0.7 1.0 1.5 1.8
Latin America ................... 2.1 2.1 2.3 2.6
Asia ............................ 0.2 1.1 1.2 1.8
Excluding Japan ................. 0.2 1.1 1.2 1.8
Japan ........................... 1.3 1.3 1.6 1.3
Developed areas ........................ 0.9 0.9 0.3 1.2
Souncu: Vaious inues of U.N. DEP1' OF EcoNoac AND SOCIAL APPAUS, DEMooaAPHIc YEARBoo&
World War I seems to have marked a turning point. Between i92o and 194o
,
the rate of population growth in the underdeveloped parts of the world increased to
about 1.3 per cent annually, while that in the developed parts of the world remained
at about one per cent or slightly under. Since i92o, the underdeveloped parts of the
world have continued to forge ahead, and during the period i95o to 1957, their popu-
lation grew about half again as rapidly as did those of the developed countries.
It may be of interest to note that war, as a Malthusian device for slowing popula-
tion growth, seems to be operative on the developed parts of the world rather than
the underdeveloped. During the decade 1940 to x95o, encompassing World War
II, the developed countries grew at a rate of about o.3 per cent annually, as con-
trasted with a 1.5 per cent rate of growth in the underdeveloped areas.
B. Present Distribution of Population
Examination of the distribution of the world's population by continents and sub-
continents-as is shown in table two-reveals the approximate distribution of the
underdeveloped areas. Asia contains over one-half of the world's population. Main-
land China alone may contain about one-quarter of all the human race. Latin
America and Africa each contains a little under one-tenth of the total.
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TABLE II
POPULATION OF THE WORLD BY CONTINENTS AND REGIONS: 1920-57 (MILLIONS)a
Regions 1920 1940 1950 1957
World ............................. 1,810 2,246 2,492 2,795
Underdeveloped areas ............. 1,198 1,516 1,738 1,973
Africa ........................ 140 172 199 225
Northern .................. - 37 43 50
Middle .................... 123 142 158
Southern .................. . . 12 14 17
Latin America ................ 91 131 163 192
Middle .................... 30 41 51 61
Southern .................. 61 90 112 131
Asia ......................... 967 1,213 1,376 1,556
Southwest ................. 44 54 61 72
Southcentral ............... 326 410 466 513
Southeast ................. 110 155 171 193
East (excluding Japan) ...... 431 523 595 687
Japan ..................... 56 71 83 91
Developed areas .................. 612 730 754 822
North America ................ 117 146 168 189
Europe ....................... 328 380 393 414
Oceania ...................... 9 11 13 15
Soviet Union .................. 158 192 181 203
NoTz: * Due to rounding, the .urms may not necesarily equl the totals shown.
SouRCES: Various issues of U.N. DEP'T OF ECONOMC AND SOCIAL APFAXrn, DruooAPHnC YEAM1o.
The rest of the world, euphemistically referred to as the "developed" areas, con-
sists of North America and the Soviet Union, each containing about seven per cent;
Europe, containing about fifteen per cent; and Oceania, containing about one-half
of one per cent of the total world population. If we define the most developed parts
of the world as consisting of North America, northern and western Europe, and
Oceania, we find that these areas contain just one-eighth of the human race.
From the viewpoint of its relevancy for the future economic growth of the under-
developed areas, therefore, we can say that less than one-quarter of the world's popula-
tion is being called upon to supply much-if not most-of the capital investment
needed by some three-quarters of the world's people.
C. Births, Deaths, and Natural Increase
Population growth for any given country results from an excess of births over
deaths and an excess of immigrants over emigrants. Historically, migration has
been of very great importance in certain parts of the world and at certain times.
Thus, for example, the nineteenth century witnessed the great exodus from Europe
to the Western Hemisphere, resulting in a decreased rate of population growth
in Europe and an accelerated rate of population growth in the New World. During
the twentieth century, however, intercontinental migration has played but a minor
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TABLE III
ESTIMATED VITAL RATES BY CONTINENTS AND REGIONS: MIDDLE 1930'S AND MIDDLE 1950'S
(PER 1000 POPULATION)
AROUND 1937 ANNUAL AvERAGE 1953-57
REGIONS
Natural Natural
Births Deaths Increase Births Deaths Increase
World ...................... 34-38 24-27 7-14 34 18 16
Africa ................... 40-45 30-35 5-15 45 27 18
Northern ............. - - - 45 26 19
Tropical and southern. - - - 45 27 18
America ................. - - - 32 12 20
North ................ 17 11 6 25 9 16
Latin ................ 40.45 20-25 15-25 40 16 24
Middle ............ - - - 41 15 26
South ............. - - - 39 16 23
Asia ................... - - - 39 21 18
Southwest ........... 40-45 30-35 5-15 42 18 24
Southeentral .......... 40-45 30-35 5-15 42 28 14
Japan ................ 28 17 11 19 8 11
Remaining far east .... 40-45 30-35 5-15 38 19 19
Europe .................. - - - 19 11 8
North, west, central.. 17 13 4 18 11 7
Southern ............. 23 16 7 21 11 10
Oceania ................. 20 11 9 25 9 16
Soviet Union ............. 30-34 17-21 9-17 26 8 18
SoucEs: Estimations from data presentedin U.N. DEP'T or EcoNoMc AND Soc uL ArFIS, WORLD POPULATION TRmDs, 1920-1947,
POPULATON Sr unIs No. 3 (ST/SOAI Ser. A) (U.N. Pub. Sale No. 1949. XIIL 3); U.N. DEP'T oF EcoNiouC AND SocIAL AFPRS
Dzmoo.,.wImc YEARsoox table 2 (U.N. Pub. Sales No. 1958. XIL 1).
role in affecting the rate of population growth.3 Accordingly, let us turn to a closer
examination of birth and death rates.
In the underdeveloped parts of the world-as is shown in table three-the birth
rate, expressed as annual births per i,ooo population, is about forty or more. Africa
may have a birth rate of about forty-five, and Latin America and Asia of perhaps
forty. In numbers of births, these rates mean that during the i95o's, there were
about iooooooo births in Africa annually, about 8,ooo,ooo in Latin America, and
over 6ooooooo in Asia-for a grand total of some 8o,oooooo births annually.
In the developed parts of the world, the birth rate is about half as high. In
Europe, it was about nineteen during the i95o's, and in North America, Oceania, and
the Soviet Union, about twenty-five. Altogether, there were about 18,ooo,ooo births
annually.
Death rates, like birth rates, are very high in the underdeveloped parts of the
world. In Africa, expressed as annual deaths per i,ooo population, it is estimated to
be about twenty-seven, in Asia, perhaps twenty-one, and in Latin America, about
sixteen. Thus, in the underdeveloped areas of the world, there are over 40,000,000
deaths annually. The excess of births over deaths, hence, amounts to a little less
than 40,ooo,ooo annually. The population in the totality of the underdeveloped areas
of the world, therefore, grows at a rate of about two per cent annually.
3For further discussion of migration, see, e.g., Eugene Kulischer, Migration, 15 E,cyc. BRIT. 462
(1956 ed.)
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In the developed parts of the world, the death rate is about ten; and there are an
estimated 8,oooooo deaths annually. The average annual excess of births over
deaths, hence, amounts to about iooooooo. This implies a rate of population growth
of a little over one per cent annually.
In summary then, during the 195o's, the rate of population growth was much
higher in the underdeveloped areas of the world than in the developed, largely because
of the much higher birth rate. That the rate of population growth is not higher
than that observed-almost two per cent annually in the underdeveloped areas-is
ascribable entirely to the fact that death rates are still high, and about double those
in the developed parts of the world.
Death rates, however, have been declining throughout the world-as is also shown
in table three-particularly in the decade and a half following World War II. All
of the underdeveloped areas have not experienced the same decreases; indeed, some
probably have as high a rate of mortality in 196o as a generation earlier. What is
most important is the fact that in those countries in which there was a sharp drop
in the death rate, there was virtually no drop in the high birth rate. As a result, the
rate of population growth has increased significantly and promises to increase even
more as further efforts are made to reduce the death rates.
Ceylon is often cited as an example of how rapidly mortality levels can be reduced
and the immediate effects of such reductions upon population growth. In 1945,
Ceylon had a birth rate of about thirty-seven and a death rate of about twenty-two,
leaving a rate of natural increase of fifteen. Various public health measures intro-
duced in the late 194o's brought the death rate down, and in 1957, a rate of ten was
reported. The birth rate, however, continued unchanged, and a rate of thirty-seven
was reported in 1957 also. The rate of population growth thus increased from fifteen
to twenty-seven.
In the economically-more-developed countries also, there were decreases in mor-
tality rates during recent years, accompanied in some cases by increases in fertility
rates. Both birth and death rates in these countries are sufficiently low, however, so
that the rate of population increase remains considerably below that of the under-
developed countries. Furthermore, death rates in the developed countries cannot
drop very much more, so that there is little likelihood of increased rates of popula-
tion growth in the future.
II
SocioEcoNoMic FAcroRs RELATED TO POPULATION GROWTH
As we mentioned earlier, birth and death rates are parts of an interrelated matrix
of social and economic factors; changes in any one part of this matrix ultimately
result in changes in all other parts. These changes are not necessarily instantaneous;
perhaps several decades may elapse between the time one element changes and
other elements follow suit. Furthermore, our knowledge is too limited to specify
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the exact natures of these interrelationships. Accordingly, in the following pages,
we shall examine some of the factors that are associated with birth and death rates
and note how these factors may be changing. On the basis of such historical
observations, we can make some efforts at estimating possible future developments
and their possible repercussions on the vital rates and the rate of population growth.
A. Inanimate Energy Consumed
Perhaps the best single index of technical and economic development is afforded
by the amount of inanimate energy-i.e., energy derived from coal, oil, water power,
and other nonhuman or animal sources-consumed per person-as is shown in table
four. A modern economy is based on the use of such energy; the economically
underdeveloped areas characteristically use human and animal power. The range in
the use of inanimate energy is very great and is in the order of iooo to one. The
United States consumed over 7,0o0 kilograms of energy per capita in 1958, whereas
some countries, as Afghanistan, for example, consumed under ten.
TABLE IV
ESTIMATED CONSUMPTION OF INANIMATE ENERGY BY CONTINENTS AND REGIONS: 1929-58
TOTAL METRIC TONS KILOGRAMS PER PERCENTAGE
(millions) CAPITA CHANGE 1950-58
REGION ___
Per
1929 1950 1958 1950 1958 Total Capita
World ......................... 1799 2677 3699 1070 1300 38 20
Underdeveloped areas ........ 155 278 600 160 300 116 88
Africa .................... 17 40 63 200 271 59 36
Latin America ............ 27 66 122 410 620 86 50
Haiti ................. .015 .059 .100 20 30 70 50
Puerto Rico ........... 1.100 3.100 480 1360 180 180
Asia ..................... 111 172 415 140 264 140 90
Afghanistan ........... .057 .110 3 8 90 170
India ................. 25 36 55 100 137 150 37
Japan ................. 47 64 80 780 870 25 12
Developed areas.............1644 2399 3099 3180 3700 29 12
North America ........... 858 1230 1421 7420 7420 16 0
Europe .................. 697 781 1035 1990 2470 33 24
Oceania .................. 15 32 43 2500 2880 35 15
Soviet Union............. 73 356 600 1780 2900 68 63
No=: Not available.
Souacrs: U.N. SrAxxsnTcAL PAPERS, WORLD Esmc SUPPLIES INSELECTED YEA1S, 1929-1950 (ST/STAT/Ser. J/1) (U.N. Pub. Sales
No.1952. XVIL 3); WORLD ENERO SUPPLIES 1950-1958 (ST/STAT/Ser.J/3) (U. N. Pub. Sales No. 59. XVII. 7) (1960).
Since some of this energy is used for heating it might be thought that countries
in warm climates would, of necessity, consume less energy. Even within the tropics,
however, we find very great variations. Thus, Puerto Rico annually consumed over
1,3oo kilograms per capita, whereas Haiti, hardly ioo miles away, consumed only
about thirty. On the basis of all other information available, we know that Puerto
Rico is a much more developed area than is Haiti. In Asia and Africa, annual per
capita consumption of energy amounted to between 2,60 and 27o kilograms; in Latin
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America, it was a little over 6oo. For all the underdeveloped areas combined, annual
consumption was estimated to be about 30o kilograms of energy per capita.
Within the developed parts of the world, there was also considerable variation in
energy consumption. Thus, the North American population annually consumed
over 7,ooo kilograms of energy per capita, whereas in Europe, Oceania, and the
Soviet Union, between 2,5oo and 3,000 were consumed. For the developed area
as a whole, annual consumption averaged about 3,7oo kilograms of energy per capita,
or twelve times as much as in the underdeveloped areas.
That technological and economic development has been proceeding over the
last generation in the continents that we have included under the term "under-
developed" areas is dearly evident. In x929, these underdeveloped areas had used
about i55,oooooo metric tons of energy; two decades later, in i95o, they used about
three-quarters again as much. Because of population growth, annual per capita con-
sumption of energy did not quite increase this much; nevertheless, it increased from
i2o to i6o kilograms. Between x95o and 1958, however, there was a vast increase
in the use of inanimate energy in the underdeveloped areas; annual per capita con-
sumption almost doubled in eight years to reach a high of 300 kilograms. In light
of available information on power-plant construction during the late x95o's and
contemplated construction during the 196o's, we have every reason to believe that
the use of inanimate energy will continue to increase rapidly within the foreseeable
future.
In the developed parts of the world, there was also a significant increase in the
use of inanimate energy, but at a much slower rate of growth. Between 1929 and
1958, annual consumption rose from about 3,2oo kilograms per capita to 3,700.
Nevertheless, despite the fact that energy use increased much more rapidly during
the i95o's in the underdeveloped parts of the world, the discrepancy between the
developed and underdeveloped parts is still very great.
In anticipation of the following remarks on trends in income, we should note
here that increases in power production may well precede the rise in income levels.
Considerable investment is required in order to build new power plants, and a num-
ber of years may elapse before these investments begin to pay off in observable
terms of increased national income. Hence, large increases in power production
during the x95o's may portend larger increases in income during the x96o's than
occurred during the i95o's. The growth of power may also reflect the growth of
the infrastructure-the roads and transportation, irrigation, power development,
communication facilities, and other prerequisites without which modern economic
growth would not occur.
B. Income
In most parts of Africa and Asia in the latter part of the i95o's, annual per capita
national income appears to have been under ioo United States dollars. Latin American
countries may have been slightly more prosperous; in the large majority, annual per
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capita national income seems to have been between ioo and 299 United States dollars.
By contrast, of the remaining parts of the world that we are defining as developed,
in half of the countries, annual per capita national income was over 6oo United States
dollars. Within each of the two parts-the underdeveloped and the developed-
there was tremendous variation. Thus, the most prosperous country in each group
had an annual per capita national income on the order of ten times as great as that
of the least prosperous.
Reliable information on the rates of economic change is available for only some
of the countries and only for the first half of the I95o's-as is shown in table five. In
Japan, the rate of growth-ie., real product at constant prices-averaged 7.5
per cent annually. In Bolivia, on the other hand, it seems to have averaged about
one-half of one per cent annually. In general, the few countries for which informa-
tion is available experienced rates of growth of between two and seven per cent
annually. These are all countries in which annual per capita product is estimated
to be under 6oo United States dollars. For much of Latin America, Asia, and most
of Africa, no information is available, and we cannot even hazard a guess as to the
possible rate of economic growth.
In the most-economically-developed countries, the rates of growth seem to have
been about as high as those in the underdeveloped countries. Canada, France,
Switzerland, and the United States grew at rates of over four per cent annually, and
Sweden and the United Kingdom between three and four per cent. These are
all countries in which the annual per capita product is estimated to be over
900 United States dollars.
In terms of personal well-being, the important factor is the rate of growth per
capita-i.e, after taking into account population growth. When this is done, it
becomes clear that in many countries, much of the aggregate economic growth
achieved was simply consumed by a larger population. Thus, for example, Costa
Rica experienced the very rapid rate of economic growth of seven per cent annually;
but population increased at a rate of about four per cent annually, cutting down the
rate of growth of per capita real product to about three per cent annually. The
Japanese economy also grew very rapidly and averaged about 7.5 per cent annually;
the Japanese population, however, grew at a rate of only about 14 per cent annually,
so that per capita real product increased some six per cent annually, or double that
of Costa Rica.
We noted that the economies of many of the underdeveloped areas grew quite
rapidly; we also saw that these countries are the ones with the higher birth rates.
What is most significant to note is that even relatively rapid rates of economic growth
do not automatically bring down fertility levels, at least within the space of one
decade. For example, the Venezuelan economy grew at an estimated rate of over
seven per cent annually; the birth rate in the latter part of the i94o's was estimated
to be about forty-one, and in the latter part of the i95o's, about forty-six. The popu-
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TABLE V
ESTIMATED AVERAGE ANNUAL RATES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH FOR
SELECTED COUNTRIES: 1950-55
(REAL PRODUCT AT CONSTANT PRICES)
PERCENTAGE CHANGE ANNUALLY





Argentina .................. 2.1 0.0 2.2
Chile ...................... 2.5 0.4 2.1
Cuba ...................... 2.0 0.2 1.8
Puerto Rico ................ 4.7 4.1 0.5
Europe
Austria .................... 6.9 6.8 0.1
Ireland .................... 2.0 2.4 -0.4
Italy ...................... 6.0 5.3 0.6
Spain ...................... 6.5 5.7 0.8
$200 to $299
Latin America
Costa Rica ................. 7.0 3.0 4.0
Mexico .................... 4.6 1.7 2.8
Asia
Japan ..................... 7.5 6.1 1.4
Turkey ................... 7.1 4.3 2.9
Europe
Greece .................... 7.2 6.1 1.0
$100 to $199
Latin America
Brazil .................... 5.3 2.8 2.4
Colombia .................. 6.5 3.1 2.2
Ecuador .................. 5.3 3.2 2.9
Guatemala ................. 2.9 -0.2 3.0
Honduras .................. 2.4 -0.6 3.1
Peru ..................... 4.0 2.0 2.0
Africa
Egypt .................... 3.6 0.9 2.7
Morocco .................. 3.9 2.2 1.7
Asia
Ceylon ................... 4.4 1.7 2.6
Europe
Portugal ................... 4.9 4.0 0.8
Under $100
Latin America
Bolivia ................... 0.5 -0.5 1.1
Africa
Belgian Congo .............. 7.2 4.9 2.2
Asia
Burma .................... 7.2 5.6 1.6
Cambodia ................. 2.6 --
India ..................... 3.4 1.4 2.0
Pakistan ................... 2.3 0.4 1.9
Taiwan .................... 5.6 2.6 3.0
Thailand ................... 3.2 1.3 1.9
SoircEs: Statistical Office of the United Nations; various documents including U.N. YEzane o or NATiONAL ccourm STATIffIC5(ST/SrAT/Ser. Eofor various years.
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lation of this country rose from 3,700,000 in 1940 to 6,iooooo in 1957, or about
sixty-five per cent. Again, in Costa Rica, with an economic growth rate of about
seven per cent annually, the birth rate fell from perhaps forty-four to forty during
the decade. The population increased from some 6ooooo in 194o to ioooooo in
1957, or about sixty-six per cent. In Taiwan, too, with an economic growth rate of
five per cent, the birth rate remained virtually unchanged over the decade, about
forty-four. The economy in Mexico grew almost as rapidly as in Taiwan. The birth
rate, which was about forty-four throughout the 1940's, may have risen to about forty-
seven by the latter part of the i95o's. The Mexican population grew from i9,7ooooo
in 1940 to 31,400,000 in 1957, or about sixty per cent.
In countries in which the economies grew at more modest rates, the economic
changes had even less effect upon fertility and population growth. As we shall
see subsequently, economic growth, together with other socioeconomic changes, ulti-
mately will affect the level of the birth rate. But before the birth rates will decrease
significantly, the size of the population may double, or more.
C. Food Supply4
Just as people in the underdeveloped parts of the world are poorer and use less
inanimate energy, so they also eat less. The average number of calories consumed
daily per capita during the i95o's seems to have been under 2,600 in the large majority
of the underdeveloped countries. Indeed, in some countries, such as India and
the Philippines, for example, consumption may have been under 2,ooo calories.
In very few of the developed countries, on the other hand, has consumption been
this low; in most of these countries, daily per capita food consumption appears to
have been between 2,800 and 3,400 calories. The amount of food consumed varies
greatly from one country to another, both within the developed and underdeveloped
parts of the world. Furthermore, within each country, there must be very great
variation among the different economic groups.
The Food and Agriculture Organization summarized the relationship between per
capita national income (in United States dollars) and per capita quantity of food
available for consumption (in terms of calories):'
... the general indications are ... that total food supplies for consumption rise rather
sharply with income at the lowest income level, and then at a fairly constant rate until
the highest income level, when the curve tends to flatten out.
In terms of the estimated requirements, the per capita number of calories of
food available for consumption in the grossly underdeveloped countries is inadequate,
according to the FAO analysis. In countries having an annual per capita national in-
come of under 200 United States dollars, the supply seems to be less than the biological
'For a discussion of the role of land tenure, see, e.g., CLARENCE SENIOR, LAND REFoRMu AND DE-
mOCRAcY (1958).
U.N. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION, THE STATE OF FOOD AND AGRICULTURE 88 (1957).
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requirements. In countries above this national income level, the supply of calories
seems to be greater than requirements.
In addition, the quality of the food eaten by the populace of the underdeveloped
countries appears to be inferior to that eaten in the developed areas. Cereals and
starchy foods constitute a much larger proportion of the diet in the poorer countries
than in the economically-more-developed ones. Indeed, the average person in the
United States probably consumes as food daily fewer calories from cereals and
starchy foods than does the average Latin American. On the other. hand, per capita
consumption of animal protein increases very sharply with increases in per capita
income.
The FAO report concluded:
... the common pattern of diet in most countries is a basis of cereals and starchy foods,
supplemented to the extent that the consumer can afford by more expensive and attractive
foods, including the so-called protective foods. When incomes first begin to rise above
the subsistence level, the more expensive foods are largely additional to the basic diet. At
higher income levels the consumption of the staple foods begins to decline and to be
replaced by a larger intake of protective and other [more] expensive foods, which ultimate-
ly may make up the larger part of the diet.... This fact re-emphasizes the essential con-
nection between economic development and nutritional improvement. Until productivity
is raised and the general run of people in a country earn higher incomes, any substantial
improvement in nutrition is unlikely....
Now, how does the long-run increase in population compare with possible trends
in the volume of agricultural production? Available data for a number of countries
-as is shown in table six-permit us to compare population and agricultural produc-
tion changes from the mid-x93o's to the mid-x95o's. In some of the underdeveloped
countries, as Thailand and Mexico, for example, the increases in agricultural pro-
duction far outstripped population growth; in a number of other countries, popula-
tion increase was greater than that of agricultural production (e.g., Egypt, Burma,
Taiwan); and in a small number of countries, the two factors grew at about the
same rate (e.g., Japan, Ceylon). On the other hand, in almost all of the countries
of the developed areas-i., North America, Europe, and Oceania-the increase
in agricultural production was considerably greater than the increase in population.
In summary, it would appear that for the world as a whole, increases in agri-
cultural production have kept up with increases in population, more or less, over the
last two decades.1 These increases have not been uniform throughout the world,
however, so that in some countries, the food situation may be deteriorating (except as
international trade may make up for specific deficits), whereas in other countries,
it may be improving. We have seen, however, that the people in the under-
Old. at 107.
" 0. W. Willcox presents evidence that with proper scientific farming, vast increases in food are
theoretically possible. Therefore, a greatly increased population can be fed, particularly if the people are
willing to subsist on a diet of cereals almost exclusively. See Willcox, Footnote to Freedom from Want,
7 AGRICULTURE & FooD CHEMISTMY 813 (1959).
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TABLE VI
ESTimATED POPULATION GRowTH AND INCREASE IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION;







Egypt ......................... 47 34
Madagascar ................... 27 30
Morocco ...................... 56 44
Tunisia ....................... 44 20
Latin America
Argentina ..................... 47 21
Brazil ......................... 57 48
Chile ......................... 44 36
Colombia ...................... 54 84
Cuba ......................... 45 52
M exico ........................ 64 105
Peru .......................... 45 59
Uruguay ....................... 29 38
Asia
Burma ........................ 28 16
Ceylon ........................ 56 58
India ......................... 29 21
Indonesia ...................... 25 19
Japan ......................... 30 27
M alaya ....................... 50 42
Pakistan ...................... - 13
Philippines .................... 48 46
South Korea ................... - 6
Taiwan ....................... 69 30
Thailand ...................... 48 85
Turkey ........................ 49 70
Developed continents
North America
Canada ....................... 41 65
United States .................. 30 48
Europe
Austria ........................ 3 16
Denmark ...................... 20 35
Finland ....................... is 37
France ........................ 5 23
Greece ........................ 17 40
Italy ......................... 14 37
Norway ....................... 19 26
Portugal ...................... 21 34
Spain ........................ 18 1
Switzerland .................... 20 20
Yugoslavia .................... 19 11
United Kingdom ............... 9 59
Noras: * Percentage change 1935 to 1955.
b Percentage change 1934-38 to 1955/56-1956/57.
Sommas: Population data from various issues of U.N. DEP'r or EcoNoMIC AND SOCIAL AnAIS, Dn3ooaArmC YEAaOOX;
Agricultural production data from U.N. FooD AND AomcuTuro ORaANzanioN, THE STATz or FoOD )An AaicuvR 15 (1958).
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developed areas consume, on a per capita basis, between one-quarter and one-third
less food than do the people of the developed areas. Hence, in order to improve
the food situation in the underdeveloped areas, production must increase far more
rapidly than does population. Ideally, there should be an immediate increase of some
twenty-five per cent, with no increase in population.
D. Education and Literacy
The majority of the adults in the underdeveloped areas are either completely
illiterate or have had very little schooling; furthermore, in too many of these coun-
tries, the majority of the children of school age do not attend school-as is shown
in table seven. Japan is an exceptional instance; almost all of the adults have had,
as a minimum, some six or seven years of schooling, and almost all of the children
of school age were attending school in the early i95o's. The population of the
developed parts of the world, in contrast with the underdeveloped (excluding
Japan), have had significantly more education.
Now, what about long-term trends? We can compare the proportion of children
aged seven to fourteen, who were attending school with the proportion of their
parent generation, the adults aged thirty-five to forty-four, who reported having had
no schooling, as of the early i95o's. If there are any trends toward increased educa-
tion from one generation to the next, this will be seen by comparing the proportion
of children not attending school with the proportion of parents who had no school-
ing. If the first figure is significantly lower, we can assume that there is a trend
toward increased schooling.
Such a comparison suggests that educational progress is being made in a number
of countries. In the Philippines, for example, only thirty-five per cent of the
children in the early i95o's were not attending school. Of their parents, however,
about fifty per cent had no schooling. In Turkey, sixty-five per cent of the children
were not attending school, as compared with about eighty-three per cent of their
parents who had no schooling. In other countries, on the other hand, there seems
to have been but little, if any, progress. Thus, in Guatemala, for example, seventy-
six per cent of the children were not attending school, and seventy-one per cent of
their parents had no schooling.
During the i95o's, the numbers of children enrolled in schools have increased
significantly in many of the underdeveloped countries, as well as in the United States
and other developed areas. It is probable also that there has been an increase in the
proportion of the school-age population attending school in a number of countries.
Despite such favorable changes, however, two factors are clear: (i) The population
of reproductive ages during the 196o's and 1970's will be almost entirely illiterate in
many countries; and in other countries, it will contain substantial numbers of illit-
erates (except as adult education may change the situation somewhat). (2) De-
spite the progress made in many countries in increasing school facilities, large
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proportions of children in the underdeveloped areas are either not attending school
or obtaining but a very few years of education. The implications of this for the
birth rate and population growth follows.
If the only information available were the observed high correlation among
the countries of the world between illiteracy and high fertility, we should not be
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Nos: a Scool attendance: percentage of children aged 7 to 14, attending school; (U) signifies partly estimated.
b Adults with no schooling: percentage of adults aged 35 to 44; Japan and Mexico aged 25 and over; Fiji aged 16 and over;
Thailand aged 10 and over; Brazil aged 40 to 49.
Sounca: U.N. DEP'T OF ECeo03C AND SocrAL A a ,s, DEmoosaame YzaRBoose tables 18, 19 (U.N. Pub. Sales No. 1956. XIIL 5).
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sanguine about the effects of increasing educational levels upon the birth rate.
There are, however, many studies for individual countries showing clearly that as
the educational level of the population rises, their birth rate decreases. This inverse
relationship is not perfect, and there are some exceptions to it.
Furthermore, there is evidence that the most pronounced effects of education
occur only when the persons have had several years of schooling. Simply teaching
reading and writing is not enough; the children should have gone to school for
six to ten years. A study of Puerto Rican women in 1955 showed that those with
less than five years of schooling had an average of 4.25 children, those with five to
nine years of schooling had 3.58 children, and those with ten years or more of school-
ing had 2.20 children. A study carried out in Bangalore City, India, showed sub-
stantially the same pattern. The average number of children born to women with
a high school or college education was substantially less than the average number
born to women with lesser education; indeed, educational status below the high
school level was unrelated to fertility, women with just a few years of schooling
having just as high a fertility rate as illiterate womenf
In emphasizing the role of education, we are emphasizing the fact that a high
educational level is a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for reducing the birth
rate. Peoples living in underdeveloped areas live in cultures in which high fertility
is an integral part. In order to reduce fertility, the entire outlook on life, including
attitudes towards fertility, must undergo change. Education is a necessary part
of such changes; without increased education, economic development alone, as
evinced by increases in real product, for example, will not affect the birth rate.
E. Urbanization and Industrial Composition
The underdeveloped countries, by and large, are much less urbanized than are
the developed countries. In the large majority of the underdeveloped countries less
than twenty per cent of the population lives in cities containing iooooo or more
persons. On the other hand, in the large majority of the developed countries-i.e.,
North America, Europe, Oceania, and the Soviet Union-more than twenty per cent
of the population lives in such large cities; and in some countries, as the United
Kingdom, for example, half or more of the population lives in cities of this size.
The low levels of urbanization in the underdeveloped areas reflect the fact that
agriculture is the main industry, the main source of livelihood for the majority of
the workers. Comparatively few persons are engaged in manufacturing and other
nonagricultural pursuits. This can be seen immediately by noting that Africa,
Latin America, and Asia-the underdeveloped continents-contain but one-third the
world's total of persons engaged in manufacturing, although they contain some
seventy per cent of the world's population.
In terms of the output of goods, as approximately measured by value added by
manufacturing, the underdeveloped continents are even further behind the developed
'See A. J. JAFFE, PEOPLE, JoBs AND EcoNOMIc DEVELOPMENT 184, 362 (1959).
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areas. Although these underdeveloped areas contain about one-third of the total
number of persons engaged in manufacturing, they produce only about twelve per
cent of the world's total of manufactured products. These percentages indicate that
output per worker in the underdeveloped areas is very low relative to the developed
areas. This is borne out by the data showing value added in 1948 United States.
dollars per person engaged in manufacturing, as follows:
Underdeveloped Areas Developed Areas
Africa and Middle East ............. $i,8oo Northern North America .......... $5,900
Latin America .................... 1,30o Europe .......................... 2,ioo.
Asia, East & Southeast ............. 5oo Oceania ......................... 2,8o0
Since 1948, the manufacturing sector has been growing somewhat more rapidly,
in the underdeveloped than in the developed areas. It is estimated that in the
former areas, the volume of production increased about eight per cent annually from
1948 to 1958, and in the developed areas a little over four per cent. We noted previ-
ously, however, that population grew faster in the underdeveloped areas-i.9 per cent
annually, as compared with 1.2 per cent (in the period i95o to 1957). If we allow for
differences in the rate of population growth, then the more rapid rate of growth
of volume of manufacturing production in the underdeveloped areas-eight per cent
annually, as compared with a little over four per cent-is cut somewhat.
F. Participation of the Women in the Working Force
It is difficult to say whether women in underdeveloped areas make a greater or
lesser contribution toward the production of goods and services than do women
in developed countries. We are certain only of the fact that in underdeveloped areas,.
as contrasted with developed areas, a larger proportion of the working population is.
engaged in home industries, including subsistence or semisubsistence agriculture and
cottage industries. Hence, the working woman in Africa, Latin America, or Asia,
is more likely to be engaged in work at or around her home, whereas the North-
American or European woman who works is more likely to leave her home daily
while she works at some office or shop totally separated from her home. What does.
this aspect of working force behavior have to do with fertility?
It appears that within any one country, the highest birth rate is found among
farm women and perhaps other rural women who do not participate in the working
force. Women who carry on economic activities in or around their homes have7
only slightly lower fertility. These are the women so often found in underdeveloped
areas who have very small retail shops in their homes or make cloth or apparel or
perhaps some very simply processed food products in or about their homes. Women
who leave their homes during the day to work in a modem type of business or
industrial establishment, or government office, however, have very much lower fer-
tility. In short, active participation in the modern economic sectors, even within
grossly underdeveloped countries, is likely to result in significantly lower fertility.
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Some idea of the possible influence upon fertility when the women work away
from home in a modern type of establishment is afforded by the experiences of
Puerto Rico and Japan. In Puerto Rico, such women averaged about one-half child
less than did women who remained outside of the working force; women who were
engaged in home industries had about the same number of children as did women
who were not in the working force. In Japan, women engaged in agriculture-one
form of home industry-had the highest fertility. Women who were not in the
working force or who were engaged in home industries in nonagriculture had
slightly lower fertility. The sharpest reduction, amounting to an average decrease
of between one-half and one child, occurred among women who left their homes
for employment in the modern sectors of the Japanese economy?
As far as a nation as a whole is concerned, however, too few women in any of
the underdeveloped countries are economically engaged in the modern sectors of
the economy to affect the over-all birth rate. Even though half or more of the
women may be reported as in the working force, the great majority are engaged in
agriculture or other home industries. Thus, for example, in Japan, half of all of the
women were reported as in the working force in 1950; only ten per cent of all of
the women in the reproductive ages, however, were employed away from home. In
Puerto Rico, perhaps fifteen to twenty per cent were employed away from home.
For comparative purposes, we may note that in the United States, about one-third of
the women in the reproductive ages are so employed.
G. Mortality versus Fertility Rates
Sometimes it is thought that in underdeveloped areas, people maintain high
birth rates because the death rates are so very high; in order to insure having one
surviving male heir, it may be necessary to have six or eight births. Hence, so the
argument runs, as the death rate decreases and the people see that their children
are not dying off at early ages, they will decrease their birth rate.
The available evidence shows that this relationship, if true, holds only with a
time lag of at least one generation. Thus, for example-as is shown in table three-
the death rate in Latin America, which was between twenty and twenty-five during
the i93o's, had fallen to about sixteen two decades later, by the middle i95o's;
the birth rate, however, remained virtually unchanged at forty. Exactly the same
relationships seem to hold for other parts of the underdeveloped world, as far as
can be determined from the fragmentary data available. Thus, in Egypt, for
example, the death rate fell from some thirty-seven in the i93o's to perhaps seventeen
in the i95o's; but the birth rate remained almost unchanged around forty. In
Taiwan, too, the death rate during these two decades fell from perhaps twenty to
ten, while the birth rate remained over forty.
'Id. esp. ch. io; see also Jaffe & Azumi, The Birth Rate and Cottage Industries in Underdeveloped
Countries (to be published in Econ. Dev. & Cultural Change). The above pattern was observed as con-
trolling for age, marital status, urban-rural residence, and in the case of Puerto Rico, also for education
of women.
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We can only conclude that if people have high birth rates in order to compensate
for high death rates, then they will reduce their birth rate only after they believe
that a permanent drop in the death rate has occurred. This means that at least
one generation will elapse between the time that significant decreases in mortality
occur and the time that the people have enough confidence to reduce their birth
rate. During the course of one generation, however, the population of a country can
double, at the prevailing rates of natural increase.
H. Summary
Some of the most obvious factors that are related to the observed high fertility
rates in underdeveloped as compared with developed countries, are: (i) the rela-
tively small amounts of inanimate energy consumed for the operation of modern
machinery and other power-driven instruments of a technologically-developed
society; (2) the attendant low income; (3) the consumption of less, and perhaps
lower quality, food; (4) the low educational levels; (5) the relatively small pro-
portions of children of school age who attend school; (6) the lower degree of
urbanization; (7) the almost nonexistence of modern manufacturing, with compara-
tively few exceptions; (8) the very small proportion of women of productive ages
who participate in the modern sectors of the economy; and (9) the fact that high
mortality rates are associated with high fertility rates.
We have also seen that these factors are gradually changing, and if the trends
continue long enough, the underdeveloped countries will resemble the presently
developed ones with respect to the above characteristics, and perhaps others-ie.,
the transition from underdevelopment to development will have occurred. Within
the short run, however-say, the time of one generation from the end of World
War II-it does not seem that very much economic growth will have been achieved,
or that these factors will have altered sufficiently to diminish the present high rates of
population growth. The only immediate effects of the partial development that has
occurred in many parts of the world is that the mortality rate has fallen rapidly and
the rate of population growth has increased significantly. The socioeconomic matrix,
basically, seems largely unchanged as yet in many parts of the world. The present
political developments in Africa and other underdeveloped areas, however, may
indicate that some far-reaching changes in the socioeconomic matrix may soon begin,
if they are not already underway.
It should also be emphasized that to date, and considering the world as a whole,
food production has managed to keep up with population growth. There are varia-
tions from country to country: in some areas, food production has forged ahead;
and in others, population. To the extent that it is possible to distribute food from
surplus to deficit areas, we can say that the increasing population has not resulted in
a world-wide food deficit.
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What is most important, however, is that little improvement seems to have taken
place-again, remembering that there are some exceptions. The people in the
underdeveloped areas have too little food (in comparison with the inhabitants of the
developed areas) and they are not succeeding in increasing their per capita food
supply. The political importance of this fact is immediately obvious. The people
in the underdeveloped areas want economic development so that they can improve
itheir lot, including the amount of food available per person. They will not be
satisfied with economic advances that simply keep up with population growth. And
in order to achieve their goals, they will turn to whatever economic-political system
appears to be most promising.
III
PossiBLE FURURE GROWTH
No one can foretell with exact certainty how many people will be living in the
-various parts of the world in 1975 or 2000. All that we can do is to set up a model
,or series of models and say that if a particular set of socioeconomic trends were to
continue, then there would be a specified number of people at some future specified
date. This is exactly what United Nations statisticians did. One model that was
,constructed assumes that fertility rates will change but little from their levels in the
i95o's; that death rates will decrease; and that, consequently, population will continue
-to grow rapidly until at least 2000, the terminal year of the estimates. Another
model assumes that the various social and economic forces that we have just ex-
amnined will result in a significant lowering of fertility rates and, consequently, of the
Tate of population growth.
TABLE VIII





High Low High Low
World ........................... 2,795 3,856 3,594 6,900 4,880
Underdeveloped areas .......... 1,973 2,844 2,617 5,560 3,755
Africa ..................... 225 331 295 663 420
Latin America .............. 192 303 282 651 445
Asia ....................... 1,556 2,210 2,040 4,250 2,890
Developed areas ............... 822 1,012 977 1,340 1,125
North America ............. 189 240 232 326 274
Europe .................... 414 476 458 592 491
Oceania .................... 15 21 21 30 27
Soviet Union ............... 203 275 266 395 333
NoTr: - Due to rounding, the sums may not necessarily equal the totals shown.
SOURCE: U. N. DP'r oF Ecoxomc &No SocrAL AePsxns, THE FUrUae GROWTH OF WoRz.D PohATnOrio (ST/SOA/Ser. A/28) (U.N.
:Pub. Sales No. 1958. XIIL 2).
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Applying these models-as is shown in table eight-reveals that vast increases in
population are possible. The three continents of Africa, Latin America, and Asia,
taken together, could increase in population from 2,000,ooo,ooo in 1957 to 2,8oo,ooo,ooo
in 1975 and 5,500,000,000 in 2000. On the other hand, if they should swiftly urbanize
and improve their economies greatly, educate their peoples, and otherwise achieve
economic development rapidly, their population could increase from 2,ooo,oooooo in
1957 to only 2,600,000,000 in 1975 and 3,700,000,000 in 2000. In short, it would seem
that even under circumstances most favorable toward decreased fertility rates, the
number of people in these three continents could almost double within the next
forty years.
In the remaining areas of the world-the developed parts-the rate of future
population growth is calculated to be much smaller. Population could increase from
8oo,ooo,ooo in x957 to i,ioooooooo or 1,3oo,oooooo in 20o0. In summary, application
of the two models suggests that the most rapid rate of population growth that can be
visualized for the developed parts of the world will be significantly lower than the
slowest rates of growth that can be anticipated for the underdeveloped parts.
Whether such population increases will eventuate we cannot predict. We can
only say that if present socioeconomic trends were to continue, then the above-specified
populations would exist. Homo sapiens is notorious, however, for being able to
effect his own destiny if he so desires.
IV
POPULATION GaowTH AND PROBLEMS OF CAPITAL INVESTMENT
All of the governments and peoples of the world and all of the international
agencies are dedicated to the principle of increasing the level of living of everyone
in the world, but particularly those in the underdeveloped parts. Occasionally, the
peoples of some part of the world help their government understand this ideal by
revolting and installing in power a new set of people who promise more vociferously
to bring about such economic development. With this goal in mind, we can then
ask: How does population growth affect the rate of economic development and im-
provement in the level of living for the individual and his family?
The most obvious answer, and one that is so simple that it is almost universally
ignored, is that any amount of population growth, no matter how little, retards
the rate of improvement in the level of living, except under certain conditions to be
described later. If an economy is growing but the population remains unchanged
in size, then any increase in goods and services, minus that needed for reinvestment
purposes, is available for improving the level of living of the people. We must
assume, of course, that there is a more or less equitable distribution of the benefits
accruing from economic development. If all of the economic gains are taken by a
small group of persons for their own personal consumption or are spent on arma-
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ments, then, of course, there will be no improvement in the level of living of the
masses.
On the other hand, if there is any amount of population growth, then the in-
creases in goods and services, minus that needed for reinvestment, when divided
amongst a larger population, will result in smaller gains per capita in the level of
living. With a growing population, however, the problem is even more serious, since
a larger proportion of the increased goods and services must be used for further re-
investment purposes rather than being available for personal consumption. In short,
a significant portion of the available investment funds-either domestic savings or
foreign loans or gifts-must be used to provide the electric power and factories and
transportation systems needed to service the increase in population. Additional in-
vestment funds, if any are available, can then be used to erect the factories and other
enterprises that will result in an improved level of living.
The basic question then becomes: How much investment funds are needed if the
economy is to keep up with population growth and also improve the level of living?
For this, let us consider the capital-output ratio. The report of the Economic Com-
mission for Asia and the Far East'0 indicates that three to four units of capital seem
to be required in order to increase output by one unit per year. Although there is
very much variation from country to country, and from industry to industry, this
ratio appears to be useful for a first approximation of the influence of population
growth on economic development.
Now let us consider a country that has no population growth, but that is not
underpopulated as described below. If such a country can manage to obtain capital
investment each year amounting to between three and four per cent of its net
national output, then it can raise the per capita income of its population by about
one per cent annually. Since underdeveloped countries, by and large, seem able
to save something under ten per cent of their national output annually, it would
appear that per capita income can be increased about two to three per cent annually
on the basis of domestic savings alone, and in the absence of any population growth.
If foreign investments can be obtained amounting to another three or four per cent
of its net national output, per capita income will increase another one per cent, and
so on.
Now what happens if there is population growth of one per cent annually?
With a capital-output ratio of three or four, then capital investment amounting to
three to four per cent of output must be invested simply to keep up with population
growth. During the i95o's, the population in the underdeveloped countries was
growing at a rate approximating two per cent annually. Six to eight per cent of net
national output, then, must be allocated for investment purposes simply to keep up
" U.N. ECoNOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR ASIA AND THE FAR EAST, PRO-
GRAmmING TicHNIQUES FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPPMENT 19-22 (E/CN.xz/L. 7 7 ) (196o). See also Brand,
The World Population Problem, in INTERNATIONAL POPULATION CONFERENCE, 1959 PROCEEDINGS 27 t
seq. (ig6o); PAUL G. HOFFMAN, ONE HUNDRED COUNTRIES AND ONE AND A QUARTER BIL~ION PEOPLE
(1960).
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with population growth. Apparently, this is about the ratio of savings that has
occurred in underdeveloped countries over long periods of time. If there is to be
any increase in per capita income, foreign investments will be needed. Considering
the total amount of investment funds that might be available in the developed
countries, there does not seem to be enough funds to permit rapid increases in per
capita income in all the underdeveloped parts of the world. 1
Sometimes it is argued that increases in population alone will lead to economic
growth, since people are the creators of wealth. To the extent that land and other
resources are available that can be exploited by manpower alone and without the use
of machinery or inanimate energy, this statement is correct. Under these circum-
stances, however, the amount of production is only enough for subsistence needs, more
or less, and there is no improvement in the level of living for the individual. In
order to improve the level of living and produce vastly more goods and services, the
output per worker must be increased; this can be done only through the use of
modern--or at least semimodern-machinery and techniques, and inanimate energy.
These, in turn, require capital investment.
Historically, some underdeveloped countries have developed despite population
growth by rigorously limiting domestic consumption and reinvesting as much as
possible of the national output. In this way, economic development, but not im-
provement in the level of living, can be achieved rather rapidly-say, within the
space of a generation. This process can lead to political trouble, however, as the
masses see economic development, but do not participate in it. Whether there will
be political trouble will depend on the political organization of the country. Cer-
tainly, in a democracy, in which the people can make their voices heard, it is difficult
to prevent the people from participating in any observable economic growth.
There are some underdeveloped countries to which the above description does not
apply. These are the ones that are still relatively empty of people and that have
considerable natural resources that can be developed only as more people are present,
both as workers and consumers. Perhaps parts of Africa, some of the larger islands
in the southwest Pacific, and a few other scattered parts of the globe's surface may
fall in this category. To the extent that such underpopulated countries do have
natural resources, they can import both people and foreign capital.
V
PopuLATIoN GRo TH AND EMPLOYMENT
One noticeable feature of underdeveloped countries is that labor is inefficiently
utilized under the production systems found there. Much of manufacturing con-
sists of handicraft operations in which hand tools only are used; animals and men
rather than machines may be used for transportation; large construction jobs are
" Brand, supra note io. See also ANSLEY J. COALE & EDGAR M. HOOVER, Influence of Population
Growth on Indian Economic Development, in PoPuLATioN GROWTH AND EcoNomic DEVELOPMENT IN
LOW-INcoME COUNTRIES Pt. 4 (1958).
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often carried on with the use of but very little machinery; trade and the service
industries are all highly overstaffed; etc.
When a modern factory or business enterprise is established, labor is used much
more efficiently. It has to be so, since modern machinery as well as modern business
and managerial practices are introduced. A factory building may be erected mainly
by hand labor, but if it is to produce modern goods such as metal products or chem-
icals or textiles that can compete with similar products manufactured elsewhere,
machinery must be utilized. Indeed, many products cannot be made except with
modern machinery-as aluminum ingots, for example, or even quick frozen vege-
tables, or large steel girders. In short, the process of economic development involves
the more efficient utilization of labor. In this way, each worker produces more
and the level of living can rise.
The result is that very considerable economic growth is possible without the
need for any additional manpower. To the extent that the numbers of persons of
working-force age increase as a concomitant of population growth, these people will
be absorbed into the economy and provided with some type of employment, even
if it is only that of an unpaid family worker on a semisubsistence farm. In short,
even large-scale economic growth can be accompanied by continuing-and perhaps
even increasing-large-scale underemployment. And the faster is the rate of popu-
lation growth, the faster will be the rate of growth of the population of working
force age, and the more difficult it will be to achieve a full employment level.
This process can be illustrated with Puerto Rican experiences. During the years
1940 to 1957, there was considerable migration from Puerto Rico to Mainland United
States, as a result of which the island's population grew only about twenty per cent.
Gross national product during this decade and a half more than doubled, increasing
by 130 per cent. The labor force, however, increased by only about ten per cent.
For the decade 1947 to 1957, for which more information is available, while gross
national product increased about two-thirds, there was no change in the numbers
of persons employed. There was also very little increase in population during this
decade. This large increase in gross national product without any significant in-
crease in the labor force resulted directly from the more efficient utilization of labor
in the modern plants and establishments. 2
Mexico also experienced very rapid economic growth during the decade and a
half, 1940 to 1955; the volume of production of goods and services more than doubled.
The population also increased by fifty per cent, and there seems to have been a
piling up of underemployment in various sectors of the economy, especially in agri-
culture.P
Comparison of the two countries provides a glimpse of the role of population
growth. In Puerto Rico, with a minimum population growth, annual per capita
income, in dollars of a constant purchasing power, almost doubled in about a decade
"
2 See A. J. JAFFE, PEOPLE, JOBS AND EcotOmmc DEVELOPMEN'T ch. 9 (1959).
"S Id. ch- .3 -
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and a half. In Mexico, during the same period, total economic growth was some-
what greater than in Puerto Rico, but population growth was large, amounting to
almost three per cent annually; as a result, per capita income, in pesos of a constant
purchasing power, increased only about two-thirds.
How is it that an economy can grow so much, perhaps doubling in a half genera-
tion, without requiring additional labor? The answer seems to be as follows:
A modern enterprise can produce very great quantities of additional units or
services without employing great numbers of additional workers. When a new
establishment does open, some workers are hired. Where are they obtained? Some
were employed, some are new entries into the working force. Many, perhaps the
majority, however, are persons who simply shifted jobs. Many persons formerly
employed in the less productive sectors of the economy, such as semisubsistence
agriculture, service industries, trade, and handicrafts, will take advantage of the
better-paid job openings created by the new establishment.
Now what happens to these vacated jobs? Very often they can remain unfilled.
For example, suppose a son leaves the family farm to take a job in a newly-opened
factory; the family members remaining on the farm may be more than sufficient to
maintain its output. Or when a self-employed shoeshine boy quits in favor of a
factory job, there is no need for a replacement, since the remaining shoeshine boys
can shine all the shoes in the community.
Now these persons who have obtained jobs in the modern sector of the economy
are earning more than previously and can purchase more. They produce a secondary
effect on the volume of goods and services produced by the economy. As long as
there are vast pools of underemployed labor, however, the same number of workers
can produce increasingly more goods and services. Eventually, they will all become
fully employed, at which time, then, further increases in the volume of production
will require an increase in the volume of employment.
If there is no increase in the numbers of persons in the working force while this
process is going on, eventually everyone will become fully employed. If newcomers
are entering the working force as a result of population growth about as rapidly as
the underemployed are becoming fully employed, however, there may be no decrease
in the size of the ranks of the underemployed.
CONCLUSION
Population growth in virtually all underdeveloped areas is rapid-some two per
cent annually-and promises to become more rapid as death rates are further
reduced while birth rates remain at their present high levels. If present rates of
population growth should continue, the population of the underdeveloped parts
of the world could increase by as much as 175 per cent between i96o and 2000, or as
little as ioo per cent.
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What is so significant about such a rapid demographic growth rate is that it is
difficult to force an economy to grow at a rate very much faster than this. Lack of
sufficient investment funds, as well as other factors, would seem to make it doubtful
that an underdeveloped country can continue to expand its economy at a rate of
five to ten per cent annually, decade after decade. American experience over a
period of about eight decades-about i87o to i95o-provides an average growth rate
of about 3.5 per cent annually. If the economies of many of the underdeveloped
countries grew at only this rate, they would be doing little more than keeping up
with population growth and would be experiencing no increase in per capita income.
Even if a nation's economy grows rapidly-say, seven per cent annually: three
per cent for population increase, and four per cent in per capita income-it may re-
quire many decades before it becomes semideveloped. Suppose that per capita
income was $ioo in i96o; by i98o, it might be $200, and by 2ooo, it might reach $4oo;
this is exactly one-fifth of American per capita income in 1960. And by 2ooo, Ameri-
can per capita income should have increased also. Clearly, fertility levels and rates
of population growth must be reduced if significant economic progress is to be made
rapidly.
There are many factors influencing fertility levels. The growth of the economy
is one of these, but it influences fertility only by means of a complex series of inter-
relationships; economic growth by itself does not automatically lead to an immediate
decline in the fertility rate. Another of the elements leading to a lower fertility rate
is increased schooling and the provision to everyone of what we should call an ele-
mentary school education. As an economy grows rapidly, funds ought to become
available for a comprehensive public school system, and the parents should now be
able to afford to send their children to school. When the children become the parents
of the next generation, they should have a significantly lower fertility rate than their
parents had.
The psychological factor of heightened aspirations is another element in the
process leading to a reduced fertility rate. Urban life, formal education, modern
means of communication, and other factors, all combine with expanding economic
opportunities to provide individuals with new aspirations-aspirations that can lead
the individual to limit the size of his family. Within this framework of a changing
socioeconomic matrix, the provision of adequate contraceptive techniques will make
it easier to achieve lower fertility. The provision of birth-control information and
materials by itself, however, will contribute little if anything, toward a lower fer-
tility rate, as experience has already demonstrated.
The implications of these remarks, in light of the changes that we observed in
part two, above, seem to be that under the best of circumstances, it will still take
at least one generation, counting from the end of World War II, before there may be
a decided slackening in the rate of population growth and a very significant im-
provement in the levels of living. In the meantime, the populations of these under-
UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES 535
developed areas may have doubled, unless war, pestilence, disease, or famine become
rampant. Only those few parts of the underdeveloped world that are now grossly
underpopulated will benefit significantly from such a doubling of population.
Now, as economic development proceeds, there will be a greatly improved utiliza-
tion of the workers, and the output per individual will rise very significantly. Fur-
thermore, as the population doubles, more or less, the number of persons of working-
force age will also about double. As a result, it will be extremely difficult to achieve
full employment; it is entirely possible that both the numbers of fully employed and
of the underemployed will increase. Various measures will have to be taken to
spread some of the benefits of the national economic growth to those segments whom
the economy cannot employ fully. Clearly, the task of achieving real economic
development and substantial increases in the level of living is difficult, but not
impossible.
